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Abstract 
This paper investigates the boundedly rational route choice problem with the framework of quantal response equilibrium in 
which users are noisy optimizers to make route choice decisions. In the congestion game, we establish the boundedly rational 
route choice model together with a numerical example, and then extend the model with heterogeneous types of users. 
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1. Introduction 
Consider a network where a set of users travel along directed paths, called routes, which connect origins to 
destinations. Users are at origins and wish to reach specific destination. In order to do so, they make travel decisions 
on the network, i.e., choose routes. Yet, users’ decisions depend on route travel time over the network, itself 
depending on the flow of users taking each route and thus on the decisions of the other users. Hence, each user faces 
the following problem: Given a pattern of travel times for the different possible routes that reach the destination, 
find a feasible path. This kind of game belongs to the class of congestion games. 
By assuming all road users behave in a completely rational way and seek to minimize their own disutility, 
Wardrop (1952) defined a state of route choice, so-called user equilibrium (UE). At the UE state, no user can further 
improve her or his utility by unilaterally changing routes. By relaxing some of the behavioral restrictions implied in 
a strict deterministic disutility minimization rule, Daganzo and Sheffi (1977) developed a stochastic user 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +86-188-1063-8340.  
E-mail address: chelone@163.com. 
© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of Beijing Jiaotong University(BJU), Systems Engineering Society of China (SESC).
642   Chuan-Lin Zhao and Hai-Jun Huang /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  138 ( 2014 )  641 – 648 
equilibrium (SUE) model that considers the travellers’ imperfect perceptions of travel times. In this model, the travel 
time of a link is treated as a random variable which follows some known probability distribution. Gumbel (Dial, 
1971) and normal (Daganzo and Sheffi, 1977) distributions are two commonly used ones, which result in the well-
known logit-based and probit-based route choice models, respectively. The SUE is achieved when users can no 
longer change their perceived utility. Existence and uniqueness of UE or SUE in general networks have been well 
investigated in the literature, including the solution methods for obtaining these two states (Sheffi, 1985; Yang and 
Huang, 2005).  
The third equilibrium type is boundedly rational user equilibrium (BRUE). As a relaxation of perfect rational and 
optimal assumption, the notion of bounded rationality was proposed by Simon (1955) and introduced to traffic 
modeling by Mahmassani and Chang (1987). It has been shown that bounded rationality is important in many 
contexts (see, e.g., Conlisk, 1996, and references cited therein). In the transportation field, Mahmassani and Chang 
(1987) studied the existence, uniqueness, and stability properties of BRUE in the standard single-link bottleneck 
network. Many simulation and experimental studies have incorporated travelers’ boundedly rational behaviors (e.g., 
Hu and Mahmassani, 1997; Mahmassani and Liu, 1997; Mahmassani, 2000). Lou et al. (2010) is the first to 
systematically examine the mathematical properties of BRUE in a network traffic assignment context. More 
specifically, as Mahmassani and Chang (1987) point out and discussed by Lou et al. (2010) and Di et al. (2013), 
BRUE flow distributions in a static network may not be unique and the set of all possible BRUE flow distributions 
is a non-convex and non-empty set. In these studies, travelers with bounded rationality still follow the behavior that 
exhibits a tendency toward utility maximization, but not necessarily to the absolute maximum level, and travelers 
are boundedly rational in the sense that they may choose non-shortest paths if the travel time saving offered by 
switching to the shortest path is not big enough (or no larger than a threshold value). Different from these studies, 
McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) proposed the idea of quantal response equilibrium (QRE), which provides a way to 
incorporate bounded rationality into game theoretic reasoning. In this study, we focus on the travelers’ route choice 
behavior with bounded rationality in the framework of QRE. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we establish the boundedly rational route choice 
model in the framework of quantal response equilibrium together with a numerical example. Section 3 extends the 
model with heterogeneous users. Section 4 concludes the study. 
2. The boundedly rational route choice model with QRE framework 
Congestion games model the interaction between users who select routes to go from the origin to the destination. 
The most widely studied cases in transportation networks are (a) user equilibrium (UE) and (b) stochastic user 
equilibrium (SUE). Existence and uniqueness of these two patterns have been established under a variety of 
conditions (Sheffi, 1985). Specifically, these two patterns entail two assumptions. First, every traveler is a perfect 
optimizer. Second, every traveler can perfectly predict other travelers’ choices. These assumptions give rise to the 
Nash equilibrium concept, which often yields sharp theoretical predictions. However, in practice, common 
knowledge of perfect rationality seldom holds. 
McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) incorporated decision error into an analysis of non-cooperative games. They 
proposed a more general quantal response equilibrium model using an exponential function, which corresponds to a 
logistic distribution, yields the familiar logit form that is widely used in empirical work. The quantal response 
equilibrium notion can be viewed as an extension of standard random utility models of discrete choice, or as a 
generalization of Nash equilibrium that allows noisy optimizing behavior while maintaining the internal consistency 
of rational expectations (Haile et al., 2008). Individuals’ choices are assumed to be positively, but not perfectly, 
related to expected payoffs, in that decisions with higher expected payoffs are more likely to be selected. Next we 
will apply the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) framework to model the boundedly rational route choice problem. 
Assume the following route choice situation: every decision maker faces a set of I  alternatives from origin to 
destination. Let [ , ,{ }]iN I u*   be a congestion game in strategic form, where {1,..., }N n  is the set of players, 
{1,..., }I i  is the action set, iu  is the users’ utility function when choosing route i . The user’s possible strategies 
are in I . Each route is endowed with a route travel time it  which is a function of the number of users having 
already used this route. We assume each player knows N  and I , that is, each player knows who is in the game and 
the strategy sets available to each. The focus is on predicting the choice probability for an alternative i  from the 
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alternatives set. Based on the idea of QRE, at equilibrium the route choice probability for the travelers is then given 
by the following logit formula, 
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These choice probabilities are obtained by assuming that each player chooses a “noisy” best response by 
maximizing the travel time i iu H  instead of maximizing the travel time iu . We obtain the logit specification above 
by assuming that the noise terms iH  are independent and identically distributed with an extreme-value distribution. 
For more properties of Eq. 1, see McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). 
The QRE model has a single parameter K   ( 0K t ) which is called the bounded rationality parameter (Chen et al., 
2012). The degree of bounded rationality is described by an error parameter, and the equilibrium probabilities 
converge to Nash equilibrium as this parameter goes to zero. Under perfect rationality, the decision with the higher 
utility is always chosen. Bounded rationality can be modeled by adding a random element in the utility function. In 
this section, we use a common parameter K  for every traveler. As interpreted in Huang (1995), Chen et al. (2012) 
and Golman (2012), the parameter K  represents the level of rationality in each traveler’s behavior. Specifically, it 
reflects the degree of cognitive of the traveler. When 0K o , the traveler lacks the ability to make any rational 
judgment and thus randomizes over all alternatives with equal probabilities. When K of , the traveler chooses the 
utility-maximizing alternative with certainty, i.e., the QRE in this limiting case is consistent with the Nash 
equilibrium. 
Note that in the logit quantal response equilibrium model, travelers’ choice behavior follows logit quantal 
response functions. Logit responders can thus be seen as boundedly rational travelers, making errors while trying to 
choose optimal utility. This QRE model satisfies two important properties. First, travelers are noisy optimizers and 
choose stochastic best responses. Second, travelers face uncertainty over other travelers’ choices because they 
recognize that other travelers are also playing stochastic best responses. 
The term iu  in Eq. 1 is given by: 
 
 i iu U tT  , i I , (2) 
 
where U  is a constant term representing the utility received through a travel, it  is the travel time function of 
alternative i  which is assumed to be monotone increasing with the flow on it, T  ( 0T t ) is the unit utility 
coefficient of travel time. 
Then we can get the numbers choosing the alternative i , 
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where d  is the fixed total demand. 
By substituting Eqs. 1 and 2 into the Eq. 3, we then have 
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This logit equilibrium is a fixed point: the choice probabilities that determine the utilities correspond to the 
probabilities determined by the utilities via a probabilistic choice rule (Rosenthal, 1989; Huang, 1995). Then the 
logit equilibrium solution route flow ix  ( i I ) can be uniquely obtained from solving Eq. 4. For more details, see 
Fisk (1980) and Sheffi (1985). 
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In addition, we enrich the standard QRE model by allowing the bounded rationality parameter K  to change over 
time. We assume players become “more rational” through repeated congestion game play. This indicates that the 
bounded rationality parameter K  may in fact increase over time due to learning. Specifically, we assume that 
individuals follow an exponential learning curve. To incorporate such an effect, we allow the bounded rationality 
parameter in round t , denoted by  tK , to increase exponentially over time: 
 
    1tt eOK K  .  (5) 
 
where O  is the rate of learning. 
In particular, we have  0K K  and  K f  f . Similar approaches have been adopted in the literature (e.g., 
McKelvey and Palfrey 1992). 
 
Example 1. We employ a simple two-route congestion game to illustrate the above model. The total demand is 
100. The BPR (Bureau of Public Roads) travel time function is used as 
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where 0it  is the free flow travel time on route i , iC  is the capacity of route i . 
The values of parameters are given in Table 1. 
 
                                      Table 1. The values of parameters 
Parameter 01t   
0
2t   1C   2C   T   
Value 15 20 60 50 1.0 
 
Fig. 1 depicts the relationship between 1x  and K . When 0K  , the *1 50x  . That means the travelers lack the 
ability to make any rational judgment and tend to be uniformly assigned on the two possible paths. As K  increases, 
the number choosing route 1 increases. When K of , the *1 74x  . By solving the Nash equilibrium route choice 
problem, we also get the result, *1 74x  . When K of , the QRE in this limiting case is consistent with the Nash 
equilibrium. The similar property can also be found in Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 1. The relationship between 1x   and K  
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Fig. 2. The relationship between 2x  and K  
 
Fig. 1 and 2 also show that the number choosing route 1 is larger than that choosing route 2. The reason is that 
the free flow travel time of route 1 is lower than that of route 2, and the capacity of route 1 is higher than that of 
route 2. 
3. Model extension with heterogeneous types of users 
In this section, we explore a logit quantal response equilibrium model where players’ choice behavior follows 
logit quantal response functions but there is heterogeneity with respect to the responsiveness parameter. Let 
[0, )jK  f  denote the type of player j . According to the above model, the equilibrium strategies, which map types 
into choice probabilities, of all players are common knowledge in equilibrium, but players may have different 
beliefs about the type distributions. Denote the conditional subjective beliefs of player m  about the type of player j  
by ( )mj j mF K K  , where we assume that each mjF  has support contained in [0, )f , a smooth density function mjf . 
With logit response functions, choice probabilities are logit transformations of expected utilities, the probability 
of j  choosing action i  as a function of jK  is: 
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We next turn to the beliefs that other players m  have about j ’s choice probabilities without knowing jK , but 
with their subjective beliefs mjF  about its distribution. We denote type mK  of player m ’s belief about player j ’s 
choice probabilities by  mj jpV . Therefore, given j ’s strategy,  jp x , the belief of type mK  of player m  that 
player j  will choose action i  is 
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Given  j j j jpV K  , the beliefs of type jK  of player j  about the profile of choice probabilities of all players 
other than j  , type jK  of player j ’s expected payoffs are 
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With the logit response functions, Eqs. 7, 8, and 9 must all be satisfied simultaneously. This leads to the 
following: 
Definition 1. p  is a subjective heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium (SQRE) if: 
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Next we consider the special case of SQRE corresponding to the assumption of rational expectations of players’ 
type distributions. That is, we eliminate the element of subjectivity from SQRE, leaving only heterogeneous QRE. 
In particular, we require that mj jF F  for every j , and that the distributions of each player’s type is common 
knowledge. Each player is independently assigned by nature a response sensitivity, jK , drawn from a commonly 
known distribution,  j jF K  . Therefore, given the j’s choice probability functions, ( )jp x , the probability j  
chooses route i  is 
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Both the strategies and distributions of types are common knowledge, given jV , the strategies of all players 
other than j , j’s payoffs can be expressed as 
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In a heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium with logit response functions, Eqs. 7, 11, and 12 must all be 
satisfied simultaneously. This leads to the following: 
Definition 2. p  is a heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium (HQRE) if: 
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Theorem 1. (Rogers et al., 2009) In finite congestion game, a heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium exists. 
Note that if j mK K  for all j  and m , HQRE collapses to standard (homogeneous) QRE. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, bounded rationality is considered to be incorporated into the route choice model. We applied the 
framework of quantal response equilibrium to model the kind of route choice behavior in a congestion game. The 
model extension with heterogeneous users is investigated. Actually, the modeling method used in this paper is 
similar with the well-known Logit model, and both models cannot be used in the general network. In the future 
research, we plan to carry out the route choice experiment to calibrate the model parameters, and study the learning 
adjustment mechanism to realize the Wardrop equilibrium. Other kinds of choice models such as departure time 
choice models or mode choice models with bounded rationality are also our future research topics. 
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